Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales

Wagstaff war narrative, 18-20 May 1915 / C. M. Wagstaff
MLDOC 2478

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ANZAC

Summary of events from midnight 18/19 to 6 a.m. 20th

References to Squared Map 1/40 000 and to Plan of Anzac Position 1/10 000

The period under report has been occupied taken up with what may be described as a general action. Some warning of the possibility of this was received from two sources. G.H.Q. passed on to us information received from the aerodrome that a large force of the enemy were about 228 land in with four steamboats and a number of small boats off the shore; HMS Triumph reported that there was a movement of troops from North and East of Krithia west along the coast.

This information was thought to be sufficient indicative of a possible attack in force to warrant sending a warning out to the troops to be on the alert. This warning reached the trenches at 10 p.m. and resulted in all troops being prepared for the heavy fire attack made at midnight, and for the actual series of attacks which commenced at 4 am shortly after 3 am
The troops under my command were disposed during the night as follows –
Main Position
No.1 Section - 3rd Aust. Infy Bde.- 6 guns APA 6 guns IMA
No.II Section - 1st Aust Infy Bde.- 5 guns APA 1 6"H
No.3 Section - 1st Light Horse Bde 3 guns NZA 4th Aust.Infy Bde 3 guns 1MA 2.4.5" How.
No.4 Section.- N.Z. M.R. Bde M.R. Bde 4 guns NZA 3 guns IMA 2.4.5" How 1.6"
Local Reserve in valley in rear of No3.T and 3 sections. 2nd Aust.Infy Bde.
General Reserve on Beach position - Beach parties 3 guns APA 16 Machine guns 1 gun NZA.

During the 18th our positions were subjected to a heavy fire from large calibre guns up to 12" & howitzers. Chiefly in No3 section and on the track.

At midnight 18/19 a heavy rifle and machine gun fire broke out from the enemy positions at the head of Monash Gully and about Baby 700 directed chiefly on Quinn’s Post. This fire was the hottest we have known as yet but it caused few casualties. It continued till 3 a.m. when

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It slackened and then broke out again at 4 a.m. on this Post.

Shortly after 3 a.m. an attack in force was delivered against the left of No.II Section, which was beaten off with heavy loss by 4 oclock-

Another attack was delivered before daylight on the centre of No.II section, which was repeated four times, and each time was repulsed with heavy loss and few casualties on our side.

At the same time a heavy attack was delivered on the N.E. Salient of No.4 Section which was repulsed and followed up. Shrapnel fire however prevented the counter attack from pressing in –
Attacks were also delivered on Quinn’s and Courtenay’s Posts, and along the front of No.1 section. It was now about 5 oclock, and the action became general along the line –
A heavy artillery bombardment began at 5 am which included trenches on the beach, & the interior of the position.

By 8 a.m. there was evidence of a heavy attack developing in the direction of Quinn’s Post and large bodies of Turks had worked round into the scrub north of No.4 Section.

Our guns had been in action since 4 a.m. and were replied to by a largely increased number of enemy guns including 12" and 9.2" and a heavier nature, calibre not known, also other guns which had not previously been firing on us.

The massing in front of Quinn’s Post came to nothing; but another attack

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developed in front of Courtenay’s Post, accompanied by very heavy shelling, and by 9.30 the Turkish attack was being pressed hard against Courtenay’s left and Quinn’s right –

By 10 oclock this attack, unable to face fire from the right (ie No.11 Section) had swung round to Quinn’s left, where it was severely handled by guns in Plugge’s Plateau, and guns and machine guns of No.4. Section.

By this time 4 sections of the reserve of machine guns had been distributed and were doing good work. By 11 a.m. the enemy, who were crowded together in the trenches beyond Quinn’s Post were giving way under their heavy losses -

The impetus of the attack had now failed and the enemy seemed to be collecting and reorganizing in the valley East of Plateau 400 (224.n.8) where we continued to harass them with gun and machine gun fire –

Arrangements had been made to launch a counter attack from No.4 Section at 3 p.m. This coincided with the commencement of a Turkish attack from the direction of Baby 700 (224.d.5) which held up the counter attack. This Turkish attack did not develop, however, into anything more than a heavy fire attack, though the trenches were full of men with fixed bayonets ready to advance.

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Fire slackened off in the evening, but broke out again after dark and continued strongly throughout the night except in front of No.4 Section where it died away into the ordinary sniping.

In front of Quinn’s Post however was subjected to a heavy bomb bombardment and machine gun fire – after 5 a.m. there was such a complete cessation of activity behind the enemy’s trenches, which are strongly occupied, that it is very desirable to have aeroplanes reconnaissance to follow the enemy’s movements which we cannot follow from our overlooked positions, nor can our patrols, in the present situation keep touch.

The reports of prisoners have already reached you through your G.H.Q. representative who estimates that 30,000 troops were used against us, of which five regiments appear to have been fresh troops –

The enemy’s casualties, as previously reported, were large – It is impossible to estimate numbers, but at least 3000 dead are lying in the trench in view of our trenches while their own trenches are probably full of them.

Our artillery fire, in spite of our disadvantageous position, was responsible for a large proportion of these losses – All guns were in action throughout the day, and all reports from Section Commanders shew that the results

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obtained amply justify the very large expenditure of ammunition –

Our casualties have not yet been fully verified, but amount to about 100 killed and 9 officers and 400 men wounded. Some 30 sick have been evacuated in the past 24 hours –

A full report of this action will be compiled when detailed reports are received and forwarded to you when ready –

C.M. Wagstaff

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AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

COPY

Army Corps Headquarters,
Anzac Cove, 20th May, 1915.

Circular Memorandum

It is with the deepest regret that I have to announce to the Army Corps the death on the 19th instant of Major General W.T.Bridges, C.M.G., Commander of the Australian Division. General Bridges has proved himself a most gallant soldier and excellent commander. To me personally his loss is a grevious blow; no Commander could have received more loyal and devoted service than I have received at all times from General Bridges. To him the Australian Division owes a debt which it can never repay for his untiring and unselfish labours, which are responsible for the high state of organization to which the Division has been brought in every detail.

The high ideals he placed before all ranks will I hope go down to the honour of his name as long as the Military history of Australia lasts.

(S’gd) W.R. BIRDWOOD,
Lieut-General,
Commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

[Transcribed by June Pettit for the State Library of New South Wales]